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The aim of this paper is to provide quantitative information about the position
of the UK in the network of global value chains (GVCs) and to discuss its
implications for the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy. We find that the UK has
become much less integrated into global production networks than other EU
countries over the period 2000–14, and is almost unique among EU countries in
that the domestic content of its exports increased over this period. This reflects
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the relatively high and growing domestic service content in UK exports. As
a result of this, reducing the UK’s tariffs on imported goods is unlikely to
have a large direct effect on the average export competitiveness of UK firms.
Potentially more significant for the UK is how future trade barriers with the EU
are likely to affect its participation in cross-country value chains that meet final
demand in markets in North America and East Asia. Such indirect exports are
not captured in conventional trade statistics and can only be analysed using a
GVC approach. Our findings suggest that the UK will benefit only to a limited
extent from bilateral trade agreements with countries outside the EU (a ‘Global
Britain’ strategy) if it gives up its role in the supply chains that service these
countries via the EU hub.
Policy points
 It is often argued that a key benefit to the UK of leaving the EU Customs
Union would be that it would gain the ability to reduce tariffs on imported
inputs and so improve the competitiveness of its exporters. However, the
gains from such a policy are likely to be small, because the foreign value
added content in UK exports is relatively low and because the tariffs that
the EU currently imposes on intermediate goods used by UK industries if
imported from outside the EU are quite small. Particular sectors would be
affected relatively more than others.
 Over the period 2000–14, the UK has become increasingly specialised in
exporting services. Membership of the EU Customs Union, or access to
a Single Market for goods (as in the UK government’s recent ‘Chequers’
proposals), will therefore only reduce the negative economic consequences
of Brexit to a limited extent.
 Part of UK exports to the EU are final products and also consumed in
the EU. But exported goods and services from the UK are also used as
intermediate inputs in production in the EU, and exported again to countries
outside the EU.
 Taken together, these findings have important implications for the strategy
of disengaging with the EU in order to gain greater access for the UK’s
exporters to rapidly growing markets elsewhere (a strategy known as
‘Global Britain’). Unilateral tariff reductions are not likely to have large
effects on exporting firms’ input costs on average. Moreover, a loss of
access to EU markets may discourage UK firms from participating in
value chains with nodes in the EU currently exporting significant amounts
to China and other fast-growing economies.
I. Introduction
Over the last few decades, the production of goods and services has become
more and more internationally fragmented as countries have tended to
C© 2018 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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specialise in particular activities within a production (‘value’) chain. The
growth of global value chains (GVCs) means that a country’s industries
increasingly import unfinished components or business services to produce
goods and services which are in turn exported elsewhere. These trends
have made the nature of international trade ever more complicated and
interconnected. For example, the immediate destination of a country’s exports
may not be the same as the country where the final demand for those exports
ultimately comes from. In addition, a country’s access to imports may
contribute to the competitiveness of its exporters. These facts have important
implications for discussions of countries’ bilateral trade deficits, the effects of
exchange rate realignments and the impacts of trade barriers. For instance, by
increasing the price of imported inputs, tariffs and exchange rate depreciations
will make exports that embody these imported products more expensive as
well.1
The rise of global value chains is naturally also important for assessing
the potential impacts and opportunities to the UK following its vote to leave
the European Union (EU) in June 2016. Supply chains form an important
component of EU–UK trade, with intermediate goods and services accounting
for a majority of both the UK’s imports from and its exports to the EU.2
The aim of this paper is to provide quantitative information about the
position of the UK in GVCs and to set out its implications for the UK’s post-
Brexit trade policy.We base our analysis on new indicators and decompositions
from the trade literature that are specifically designed to illustrate the role of
international production fragmentation in a country’s imports and exports. Our
paper is the first to apply the bilateral VAX-D and VAX-C measures set out
in Los and Timmer (2018). These decompositions of a country’s value added
in exports can be used to illustrate the importance of global supply chains
for a country’s exporters, and the degree to which one country’s access to
particular fast-growing markets (such as China) depends on the export access
of third countries to which it supplies production inputs. These are particularly
important considerations for a case such as Brexit where the UK is set to move
away from structures promoting economic integration within the EU, in the
hope of gaining access to alternative markets through new bilateral deals (a
strategy known as ‘Global Britain’).
While our paper sets out important facts and context for interpreting
structural estimates, we do not provide new quantitative estimates of Brexit’s
likely economic impact.3 Rather, we highlight salient facts that are highly
relevant for future trade policy discussions, but which would not be evident
without the data and methods we use.
Throughout the paper, we draw on the 2016 release of the World Input–
Output Database (WIOD), which covers the period 2000–14.
1Johnson, 2014.
2Levell, 2018.
3For these, see Dhingra et al. (2016), for instance.
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Our main findings are as follows:
 The EU is currently a significant source of production inputs for certain
UK industries. Overall, the EU accounted for 9.3 per cent of UK firms’
intermediate inputs in 2014. This figure was highest for the manufacturing
sector, at 16.3 per cent. Within manufacturing, it tends to be higher for
the UK’s car, chemical, electrical, rubber and plastic, and pharmaceutical
industries. These industries also export relatively more of their output to
the EU.
 Despite this, however, we find that the importance of foreign value added
in UK exports is low relative to other EU countries. The UK has become
much less integrated in global production networks than other EUmembers
such as France and Germany. In fact, not only did the UK have one of
the highest shares of domestic value added in its exports in 2014, but
it was also one of the few countries in the EU for which this ratio was
increasing. This is mainly related to the increasing role of services in
the export composition of the UK. In other major EU countries, services
also play an important role in exports. However, in their case, a major
part is due to indirect exports of services through other sectors (mainly
manufacturing); thus, value added from services is embodied in exports of
goods. By contrast, UK services value added is predominantly exported
directly (i.e. in the form of services).
 The EU has become less important as a destination for UK value added
exports over the period 2000–14. However, in 2014, still almost 40 per
cent of the UK’s value added exports went to the EU.
 One way for a country to improve the competitiveness of its exporters in
foreign markets is to persuade other countries to lower trade barriers they
apply to its exports. Another is to reduce its own import barriers to reduce
the cost of foreign inputs used by domestic firms.We consider the potential
effects of the second of these channels for UK exporters after Brexit. We
find that neither the imposition of the EU’s current ‘most-favoured nation’
(MFN) tariffs on UK imports from the EU, nor the removal of tariffs
applied to imports from the rest of the world, is likely to have large direct
effects on the input costs of UK exporters. This is partly because the
MFN tariffs that the EU applies to the sort of goods UK industries use as
intermediate inputs are relatively low. Particular sectors would be affected
relatively more than others, however. Non-tariff barriers that may affect
future imports from the EU after Brexit also pose risks for sectors that
currently make use of a large amount of EU inputs.
 Part of the UK’s exports to the EU are final products consumed in the EU.
But exported goods and services from the UK are also used as intermediate
inputs in the production of the EU’s exports to other foreign markets. For
instance, 14.5 per cent of UK value added that is ultimately consumed in
C© 2018 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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China is first exported in the form of intermediate inputs to producers in
the EU. Aggregated over all destinations, 13 per cent of UK value added
reaching its final destination outside the EU goes via exports to the EU.
Figures such as these imply that, to the extent that it threatens the UK’s
participation in EU GVCs, Brexit could make it harder for the UK to
export value added to fast-growing consumer markets. The risk of losing
this part of value added exports should be subtracted from any benefits the
UK might gain from the ability to sign new trade agreements with third
countries after leaving the EU.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we
set out what we mean by a GVC approach and describe the data sources we
use. In Section III, we describe the importance of EU inputs and foreign value
added for UK industries and exporters. In Section IV, we discuss how Brexit-
related changes in the UK’s trade policy might affect its value added exports.
We first discuss the consequences of potential actions of the UK that might
increase or reduce the cost of imported inputs for the export competitiveness of
UK industries after Brexit. We then turn to discuss how barriers to exporting
to the EU might affect the UK’s participation in GVCs that meet demand in
non-EU countries. Section V concludes with some implications of our analysis
for the UK’s future trade policy.
II. Global value chain analysis and data sources
We begin with a brief discussion of our analytical approach and of the data
we use. We purposefully opt for an intuitive, non-technical presentation in the
main body of the paper. We refer interested readers to the appendix (available
online) for more detail on the methods we use, and to Los and Timmer (2018)
for a discussion of the broader context.
1. The global value chain approach
Throughout this paper, we draw on the ‘global value chain’ methodology as
developed in Los, Timmer and de Vries (2015). The basic elements of this
methodology date back to Leontief (1936).
Figure 1 (taken from Los, Timmer and de Vries (2015)) presents a stylised
GVC, in which three countries participate by contributing production factors in
different stages of the production process. All GVCs in this paper are identified
by the country and industry in which the last stage of production takes place,
before the final product is sold as a consumer product or a capital good. We
will label these the ‘country of completion’ and the ‘industry of completion’
respectively.
Let us suppose for now that Figure 1 represents the GVC for cars produced
in Germany (Country 3). The German car manufacturing industry itself will
C© 2018 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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FIGURE 1
Stylised representation of a global value chain
Source: Los, Timmer and de Vries, 2015.
employ labour and capital, and therefore create value added. It will also use
intermediate inputs, such as business services and components. Part of these
inputs are sourced in Germany itself. Labour and capital used to produce
these also generate German value added. Other intermediate inputs might be
imported from Country 2, which might be the UK. Let us suppose these are
tyres, produced by the UK’s rubber and plastics industry. This industry will
add value contributing to UK GDP, as do industries selling goods or services
to the British rubber industry. The UK rubber industry also purchases some of
its inputs abroad, in this stylised example in Country 1. Hence, the GVC for
German cars also causes value added in other countries.
In reality, GVCs have a much more complicated structure. Country 2 might
import intermediate inputs from Country 3, for example. Furthermore, the last
stage of production might require several components from many ‘first-tier’
suppliers located in amultitude of countries. In the terminology of Baldwin and
C© 2018 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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Venables (2013), such a GVC would be of the ‘spider’ type, whereas Figure 1
is the archetype ‘snake’. In reality, GVCs are hybrids of spiders and snakes.
The methods we use in this paper can cope with both. Countries participate in
many value chains. In the example above, the UK was represented by Country
2, delivering intermediate inputs to the country of completion. In other GVCs,
the UK acts as the country of completion, and it can also have the role of the
upstream suppliers represented by Country 1 in Figure 1. In GVCs with a lot
of back-and-forth trade in intermediate inputs, the UK (and sometimes even a
single industry in the UK) can have several roles simultaneously.
As stressed by Timmer et al. (2013), the value added contributions of
industries in countries add up to the value of the final output of the country-
industry of completion. Changes in the share of value added by a country
in a GVC can be interpreted as changes in national competitiveness, i.e. the
ability of a country to capture part of the value created in products of which
the location of the final stage of production is internationally contested. In
a world in which increasing shares of intermediate inputs are imported, the
share of GVC income captured by a country is a much better indicator of its
competitiveness than the value of its gross exports. The GVC approach also
links the economic performance of a country to the worldwide demand for
(specific types of) final products.
Figure 1 also shows that the value of gross exports is often larger than the
value added by the country as contained in its exports. Consider Country 2,
for example. The value of its intermediate products exports to Country 3 is
composed of the value it has added itself (we will follow the literature and label
this VAX-D, domestic value added in exports for direct use) and the value of
intermediate inputs into its own production process imported from Country 1.
In a similar vein, Country 3’s exports of final products do not only contain its
VAX-D, but also the value of its imports fromCountry 2.4 Themeasurement of
VAX-D in exports was pioneered by Koopman, Wang and Wei (2012), while
Los, Timmer and de Vries (2016) proposed a simple method to compute this
indicator, which we will use in this paper. If used in a multilateral sense (i.e.
VAX-D in exports to all countries is measured), the VAX-D indicator gives an
impression of the degree of vertical specialisation of a country. In other words,
it shows how thick or thin the domestic slices in the export bundle are. This is
what we measure for the UK and other European countries in Section III.
In Section III.3, we draw on another concept, which is the value added
of a country that is ultimately consumed in another country (i.e. that meets
final demand in some export destination). Following the literature,5 we refer
to this as VAX-C. For Country 2 in Figure 1, VAX-C is the same as VAX-D.
4In the stylised GVC depicted in Figure 1, Country 1’s VAX-D in exports and its value of gross exports
are identical, since this country does not import any intermediate products.
5Los and Timmer, 2018.
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For Country 1, however, it only includes the country’s value added embedded
in final goods consumed in Country 3. This measure cannot be used to indicate
how dependent a country is on trade that crosses a specific border, which
might be relevant when thinking about the implications of trade barriers, such
as Brexit-induced tariffs between the UK and the EU. For instance, although
Country 1’s VAX-C to Country 3 is positive, it would not be affected by
tariffs imposed by Country 3 on imports from Country 1 because the two
countries do not directly trade with each other. Effects of trade barriers are
best studied using VAX-D, while VAX-C provides better indications of the
potential consequences of changing consumption and investment demand in a
foreign country.6 In Section IV, we apply this to understand how important the
EU is as an intermediate destination for the UK when supplying to important
and fast-growing consumer markets, and thus how the UK’s access to these
markets might be affected by potential EU–UK trade barriers.
2. Data
The analysis outlined above requires a database that links consumption and
output flowswithin and between countries and that provides information on the
compensation of production factors in the industries of which economies are
composed. The data as provided in input–output tables by national statistical
institutes are for individual countries and do not provide information on the
bilateral trade between countries. We therefore have to rely on a data set that
combines national input–output tables with bilateral trade data.
Our analysis is based on the World Input–Output Database (WIOD), which
was specifically developed for global input–output analysis.7 In what follows,
we use the most recent release of the database, which includes annual world
input–output tables for the period 2000–14 and distinguishes between 56
industries. The tables include data for 43 countries and a ‘rest of the world’
(ROW) block.8 The database is publicly and freely available at www.wiod.org.
It should be emphasised thatWIODhas been constructed on the basis of official
and publicly available data.9
6Johnson (2018) provides a systematic discussion of approaches to link trade and value added in a world
characterised by GVCs.
7See Timmer et al. (2015) and Timmer et al. (2016) for detailed discussions.
8The 43 countries include the current 28 member countries of the EU and 15 major mature or emerging
markets. Among these are China, Japan and the US. The 43 countries generate approximately 85 per cent
of world GDP.
9A recent article by the UKOffice for National Statistics (2018) reported large discrepancies between the
values of UK services exports and imports as documented in official UK trade data and the values of mirror
imports and exports of UK services as recorded by partner countries. According to this article, the UK trade
surplus regarding services might well be smaller than suggested by the official statistics on which WIOD
relies. More research by ONS and partner national statistical institutes is needed before more definitive
information about the magnitudes of corrections can be given.
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In a world input–output table, the product flows (both for intermediate
use and for final use) are split into products that are produced domestically
and those that are imported. The table also shows by which foreign industry
these imported goods and services were produced. First, annual supply and
use tables (SUTs) were linked using the most recent statistics on final demand
categories, gross output and value added by industry from National Accounts.
Thus, the world input–output tables have been constructed according to the
conventions laid down by the United Nations (UN) in the System of National
Accounts. The 43 national SUTs were subsequently linked to each other using
detailed international bilateral trade data classified by end-use category (the
so-called BEC category that splits COMTRADE data into trade of products for
intermediate use, consumption or investment) and detailed import-use tables.
International SUTs were combined and transformed using Eurostat’s Model
D10 to create a symmetric world input–output table of the industry-by-industry
type.11
A proper interpretation of the results requires a brief discussion of three
characteristics of the data. First, the value added data are based on the location
of production and not on the location of ownership. This discrepancy is most
likely small for labour compensation (around two-thirds of total value added),
but much less so for other income (around one-third), which includes profits.
The profits of a UK-owned company as generated in production facilities in
Ireland will not be reported as income to the UK, but as Irish value added.
Second, re-exports have been excluded from theWIOTs, to the extent possible
given official and publicly available data. Hence, we implicitly assume that re-
exporting does not require any production factors.12 Third, it should be kept in
mind that the results of this analysis are not based on direct observation. Direct
information on the value added distribution of a particular GVC is non-existent
as firms are generally unaware of, or unable or unwilling to share, information
on the value distribution in their supply chains. Our data rely on input–output
tables that are constructed by national statistical institutes based on patchy
information about inter-industry flows of goods and services. As such, they
must be considered as an indication of broad trends only. When it comes to
getting a very detailed understanding of GVC production, case studies such
as Dedrick, Kraemer and Linden (2010) and Ali-Yrkko¨ and Rouvinen (2015)
remain extremely useful.
In Sections III and IV, we will consider the UK’s role in international value
chains both as an importer of intermediate inputs from elsewhere and as a
source of intermediate inputs for foreign industries.
10Eurostat, 2008.
11See Dietzenbacher et al. (2013) for technical details regarding the construction of the 2013 release of
the WIOD tables. A few improvements have been implemented in the construction of the 2016 tables.
12For the Netherlands, a country that re-exports much, domestic value added in re-exports is estimated
to amount to 7–8 per cent, whereas this share is about 32 per cent for regular exports (Kuypers et al., 2012).
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III. Importance of foreign producers in UK supply chains
In this section, we consider the importance of foreign and EU inputs for UK
firms’ production and exports.
Before proceeding to a more detailed analysis of the UK’s role in
international global value chains, we start by examining the general importance
of imports of foreign intermediate inputs for UK firms as seen through the
WIOD tables.
Figure 2 shows the proportion of intermediate inputs in different UK
industries that are directly sourced from overseas, and also the share imported
from the EU-27. In total, 17.9 per cent of UK industries’ inputs are sourced
from abroad, and just over half of these (9.3 per cent) are sourced from the EU.
There is notable heterogeneity across industries. The manufacturing industry
is the most intensive user of foreign intermediate inputs, where they account
for 30.9 per cent of the total value of intermediate inputs used by UK firms;
FIGURE 2
Share of UK inputs from abroad by industry, 2014
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
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16.3 per cent of manufacturing inputs are taken from the EU. The mining
and health sectors are also important users of imported inputs, which account
for 27.1 per cent and 24.2 per cent of total intermediate inputs respectively.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, service industries make less use of foreign inputs than
other sectors.
Since Figure 2 shows that manufacturing is a key user of imported inputs,
in Figure 3 we disaggregate further within this sector to see which sorts of
manufacturing industries make use of more inputs from abroad. Once again,
we show the total importance of imported inputs and also the share of inputs
imported from the EU.
The industries that make most use of imports generally are coke and
petroleum, computers and electronics, and basic metals (which, like coke and
petroleum, understandably use a lot of imported raw materials). Interestingly,
the industries that make use of a lot of imports are not necessarily the same
as those that draw on more imports from the EU. The industries that draw
most of their inputs from the EU are motor vehicles (24 per cent of inputs),
FIGURE 3
Share of UK inputs from abroad by industry, 2014
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
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FIGURE 4
Share of output exported to the EU versus share of inputs from the EU,
by industry, 2014
Note: Points are scaled according to each industry’s contribution to GDP.
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
chemicals (23 per cent), electrical equipment (22 per cent), rubber and plastic,
and pharmaceuticals (both at 21 per cent).
We can also look at which industries have the strongest direct import and
export links with the EU. Figure 4 plots the proportion of industries’ inputs
that come from the EU and the proportion of each industry’s output exported
to the EU. Each point is scaled according to the industry’s importance in the
UK’s overall GDP.
Figure 4 illustrates that the industries that export the most to the EU
also tend to source more of their inputs from the EU. The industries that
tend to both export and import relatively more from the EU are chemicals,
pharmaceuticals and motor vehicles. A disruption in UK–EU trade flows is
therefore likely to pose particular risks for these industries. While relatively
small (directly accounting for around 2 per cent of UK GDP), these industries
may have outsized importance in particular local labour markets as they
tend to agglomerate in regional clusters. Examples include car plants in
Sunderland and Knowsley, chemical firms located along the River Mersey
and pharmaceutical firms in Hertfordshire. The presence of chemical and
pharmaceutical industries in these latter locations also makes these regions
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particularly intensive in research and development (R&D) spending.13 These
industries may therefore also be associated with important spillovers to the
productivity of other industries.
Larger service-based industries, which contribute more to GDP, tend to fall
in the lower left-hand corner of Figure 4, indicating they neither directly export
to the EU nor directly import intermediate inputs from it. This is not to say
that these industries would be unaffected by trade barriers between the UK and
EU, however, as they may also supply services to industries that are in turn
exporters (as we discuss in Section IV). A few industries export a relatively
large share of their output to the EU, while not directly purchasing many EU
inputs. These include ‘activities auxiliary to financial services’, which exports
26 per cent of its output to the EUwhile only purchasing 5 per cent of its inputs
from the EU.
UK firms’ use of EU inputs is likely to be affected by Brexit-related trade
barriers between the UK and the EU. How this will in turn affect the UK
firms will depend on the nature and scale of these trade barriers and on the
substitutability between inputs sourced from different locations. We consider
these questions in more detail in Section IV.1.
Imported inputs to production may incorporate UK value added, and
intermediate inputs produced in the UK may contain foreign output. The
first of these possibilities could mean that the above statistics overstate the
importance of foreign suppliers in UK industries’ supply chains, as imported
EU inputs could in principle embed large amounts of UK content. The second
means that even if a particular industry does not make great use of imported
inputs, it may still be affected by trade barriers indirectly through their effects
on its UK suppliers.
1. UK value added in UK exports
To account for these possibilities, we now assess more holistically the role the
UK plays in international value chains, how it has changed over time and how
it compares with that of its EU neighbours. To do so, we draw on the concept
of ‘domestic value added’ in exports (VAX-D) outlined in Section II.1.
We plot the growth rates of gross exports (EXP), domestic value added
in exports (VAX-D) and GDP for the UK for the period 2000 to 2014 in
Figure 5. This shows that the gross export value of all goods and services has
been growing quickly over these 15 years, roughly doubling over the period.
Exports of domestic value added and GDP have been growing about equally
rapidly.
The years 2003–08 (just before the global financial crisis) are known to
have been a period in which production processes fragmented strongly. The
13Bernick, Davies and Valero, 2017.
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FIGURE 5
Growth of UK exports, UK domestic value added in exports and UK GDP
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
two main reasons for this were (i) vast improvements in information and
communication technology and (ii) massive trade liberalisation implied by the
accession of China to theWorld Trade Organisation and of a number of Eastern
European countries to the EU.14 As Baldwin and Venables (2013) and Los,
Timmer and de Vries (2015) have shown, these tendencies are also reflected
in the WIOD data. Still, Figure 5 indicates that the UK’s gross exports grew
roughly at the same pace as its GDP. The fact that VAX-D also grew at the
same pace as exports implies that the UK did not play a role in this global
tendency of increasing international fragmentation of production processes. In
the immediate recovery after the crisis, exports and domestic value added in
exports rebounded much faster than GDP, which implies that exports became
more important as a source of GDP in that period. This trend seems to have
been very short-lived, however, since GDP grew faster than domestic value
added in exports in the period 2011–14. As Timmer et al. (2016) have shown,
this slowdown of trade in comparison with GDP was observed in large parts
of the world economy.
In their analysis of the role played by the Netherlands in the global network
of value chains, Timmer and de Vries (2015) find that Dutch VAX-D grew
considerably more slowly than gross exports in the 2003–08 period of rapid
fragmentation of production processes. They find similar tendencies for other
smaller EU countries, such as Austria, Belgium and Sweden. A comparison
14See, for example, Baldwin (2016).
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FIGURE 6
Domestic value added in exports (VAX-D) as a share of gross exports
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
of the trends for the UK and those reported by Timmer and de Vries begs the
question of whether (i) large EU countries in general played a role in the GVC
network different from those played by smaller countries (which are, more
or less by definition, more dependent on foreign trade) or (ii) the UK itself
is an exception among larger EU economies. Figure 6 provides the answer,
depicting results for the UK, France and Germany. The vertical axis indicates
the share of VAX-D in the value of gross exports. The higher this value, the
less exports rely on imported intermediate inputs.
In 2000, before the period of rapid international fragmentation of production
processes, the VAX-D shares in exports of the three large countries considered
were not too dissimilar. The domestic value added shares across the three
countries even converged a bit further in the period between 2000 and 2003, to
percentages between 73 and 77. Sharp divergence followed in the period prior
to the 2008 financial crisis.
As Figure 6 also reveals, the VAX-D shares in exports of France and
Germany declined monotonically to values below 70 per cent, while the VAX-
D share in exports of theUK remained broadly constant. In the period following
the crisis (2009–11), France and Germany continued to source increasing
amounts of intermediate inputs used to produce exports from outside domestic
markets. A similar tendency can be observed for the UK, but the pace was
considerably slower. In the most recent period that we can analyse (2011–
14), sometimes labelled the ‘Global Trade Slowdown’, the VAX-D share in
exports grew much faster in the UK than in the other two large EU countries.
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FIGURE 7
Domestic value added in exports (VAX-D) as a share of gross exports: EU countries
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
Over the period 2002–14, the gap between the UK’s domestic value added in
exports share and the unweighted average of this share for France andGermany
increased from 1.6 percentage points to 8.6, which is a clear indication that
the UK economy responded very differently to the opportunities and threats
related to the emergence of GVCs. In 2014, the UK used even fewer imported
intermediate inputs to produce a pound of exports than it did in 2000, which
makes it a clear outlier among European countries (see Figure 7, which shows
that the UK had the highest VAX-D in exports share of all EU countries except
Greece, and that the UKwas one of only two countries with a growing VAX-D
in exports share, the other being Cyprus).
One possible explanation for this result is that the UK became a relatively
more isolated economy, maybe as a consequence of not participating as much
in the European integration process (the UK did not adopt the euro and opted
to stay out of the Schengen area). An alternative explanation relates to the
composition of UK exports: the basket of UK exports may have changed in
such a way that exports of products with high VAX-D in exports became more
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important. In order to get more insights into the actual pattern, we computed
VAX-D to gross exports ratios at the level of UK industries and compared
these for 2000 and 2014.
We find that the changes varied considerably across industries. The largest
increases in the share of VAX-D in gross exports appear to have occurred
regarding products from the computer, electrical products and optical products
industry (0.60 in 2000 to 0.68 in 2014), the wholesale, retail and repair of cars
industry (0.81 to 0.85) and the textiles manufacturing industry (0.76 to 0.80).
For as few as 16 (out of 56) industries, we find an increase of at least 0.005. At
the other end of the spectrum, we find the coke and refined petroleum industry
(0.62 to 0.43; this could partly be due to the high volatility of oil prices),
the basic metals industry (0.67 to 0.53) and the other transport equipment
industry (0.76 to 0.63). We find negative changes in VAX-D as a share of
gross exports for as many as 30 (again out of 56) industries. These results
suggest that the changing composition of the UK’s export bundle has played
a major role, rather than that decreasing integration in international value
chains could be seen in a majority of industries. Focusing on the industries
in which gross exports grew fastest (exports in 2014 minus exports in 2000),
we indeed find that out of the top ten, seven industries had VAX-D to gross
exports ratios in 2000 that were well above the average. The exports of the
wholesale industry and the administrative and support services industry grew
fastest. These industries had VAX-D in exports shares of 0.85 and 0.87 in
2000, respectively. Other prominent examples of industries that contributed a
lot to the aggregate increase of VAX-D in gross exports are financial services
and the industry that provides auxiliary services to the financial and insurance
industries.15 In the next subsection, we will more systematically investigate
the changes in the sectoral composition of economic activity in the UK related
to its exports.
2. UK sectors in the network of GVCs
We now consider the changing involvement of different broad sectors of the
UK economy (services, manufacturing, and agriculture and mining) in global
value chains and how this might explain the patterns in Figure 5.
We start by stressing that the value added perspective on exports also
changes perspectives on the role of particular sectors in exporting activity.
Approximately 41 per cent of British gross exports in 2014 were accounted
for by manufacturing industries, 55 per cent by services industries and the
remaining 4 per cent by agriculture and mining. When focusing on the origin
15The only two industries with below-average VAX-D in gross exports shares that belong to the top ten
industries in which exports grew most rapidly were the basic metals industry and the car industry. The other
industries in the top ten are virtually all service industries.
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of the value of exports, however, the picture changes dramatically: 23 per cent
of the gross export value originated outside the UK (see Figure 6), only 19
per cent was added in British manufacturing, 5 per cent by agriculture and
mining and as much as 53 per cent in UK services. Most probably, part of the
exported services value added is caused by export demand for output of the
UK manufacturing sector. Such backward linkages can only be captured if a
(global) value chain perspective is adopted.
Table 1 gives a summary picture of the sectoral origin of UK value added
in its exports (in the rows) and the sector that is exporting this value added
(in the columns), for 2000 and 2014. The elements on the diagonal indicate
what we could call value added in ‘own-sector’ exports, while the off-diagonal
elements are exclusively due to value chain effects. In 2014, almost all of the
UK domestic value added in exports contributed by the manufacturing sector
(24.9 per cent) was embodied in own-sector exports (22.9 per cent). For the
services sector, this difference between its own-sector contribution to total
domestic value added and its indirect contribution is larger: more than 10 per
cent (i.e. 69.0% – 58.6%) of all domestic value added in exports contributed
TABLE 1
Distribution of domestic value added (VAX-D) in exports of the UK, by sector







Agriculture and mining 6.5 2.7 0.4 9.6
Manufacturing 0.3 36.5 1.3 38.1
Services 1.1 17.2 34.1 52.3







Agriculture and mining 3.3 2.1 0.7 6.1
Manufacturing 0.2 22.9 1.8 24.9
Services 0.8 9.5 58.6 69.0
Total 4.4 34.5 61.2 100.0
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
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by services ended up in exports of the other two broad sectors. Note also that a
sizeable proportion of the value added embedded in UKmanufacturing exports
is generated in the UK services sector (9.5/34.5 = 28 per cent in 2014).
Ifwe consider changes between 2000 and 2014,we see that the share of own-
sector exports in total domestic value added in exports remained rather stable
for manufacturing (above 90 per cent in both years). Still, a compositional
change in domestic value added in exports is clearly visible: in 2000, as much
as 38 per cent of this domestic value added originated in the manufacturing
sector, but this had dropped to 25 per cent in 2014. The share of the commodity-
producing industries (agriculture and mining) was already low in 2000, but it
declined over the period considered. The mirror image of these changes is the
substantial increase in the share of VAX-D in exports generated in the services
sector, from 52 per cent in 2000 to almost 70 per cent in 2014. The change
in the share of own-sector exports in total domestic value added in exports in
this sector deserves special attention: in 2000, this share amounted to 65 per
cent (= 34.1/52.3), whereas it increased to 85 per cent (= 58.6/69.0) in 2014.
Growth in the relative importance of service sector exports and the growth in
service exports’ use of inputs from UK service industries thus help to account
for the patterns we see in Figure 5.
To understand how these changes might explain why the VAX-D share
in exports of the UK evolved differently from those of other EU members,
Figure 8 compares the shares of the three sectors of origin in domestic value
FIGURE 8
Shares of domestic value added in exports (VAX-D) by sector of origin, with split
in services: 2000 and 2014
Abbreviations: FR: France; DE: Germany; ES: Spain; IT: Italy.
Note: ‘Commodities’ refers to agriculture and mining industries.
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
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added in exports for five EU members, in 2000 and 2014. For services, we
make the split between own-sector exports and value chain exports explicit.
The figure reveals that the UK started out in 2000 as a country not too different
from the other large European countries. Germany’s share of services was
a bit lower (the own-sector share in particular), but the UK’s shares closely
resembled those of Spain, for example. Between 2000 and 2014, however, the
evolution of the UK pattern has been quite unique. France is the only country
among those considered here for which we also observe a sizeable increase in
the share of own-sector domestic value added in exports of the services sector,
but not to the extent of the UK. For the other countries, the patterns remained
much more stable.
3. UK value added in exports to the EU
The EU is the most important destination for the UK’s gross exports,
accounting for 43 per cent of them in 2016. This was down from 54 per cent in
2000. Much of this decline has been driven by the decline in EU demand for
final goods and services as a result of the 2011–13 eurozone recession. Between
these years, the proportion of the UK’s exports going to the EU declined from
49 per cent to 44 per cent.16
What happens if we consider a value addedmeasure of the EU’s importance
as an export market? This measure takes account of the fact that UK exports
may embed foreign content, and some UK value added may be exported to a
particular destination through the exports of a country that makes use of UK
inputs. Table 2 shows the importance of the EU and non-EU export markets
in UK value added exports across different sectors.
The table shows that the UK’s dependence on the EU as a destination
for its exports has fallen over the period considered. Whereas 46 per cent
of all UK VAX-D was contained in exports to other EU countries in 2000,
this share declined to under 40 per cent in the one-and-a-half decades that
followed.17 It is noteworthy, however, that this decline was smaller than the
decline in the importance of the EU for the UK’s gross exports. For agriculture
and mining, the change was negligible, but the shares of EU countries in
both the manufacturing VAX-D and services VAX-D in exports decreased
considerably: from 52 per cent to 39 per cent for manufacturing and from 42
16Authors’ calculations using tables B6 and B6B in https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/nationalaccounts/
uksectoraccounts/datasets/unitedkingdomeconomicaccountsbalanceofpaymentscurrentaccount/current.
17These shares are close to gross export shares, as reported by ONS. Differences are due to different
industry compositions of exports by sector to the EU and to the non-EU (industries with high VAX-D in
exports might be more prominent in exports to one destination and less in exports to the other), and to
steps in the construction of WIOD required to reconcile inconsistencies between data obtained from several
sources.
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TABLE 2
Distribution of domestic value added (VAX-D) in exports of the UK, by sector of





Agriculture and mining 4.0 5.6 9.6
Manufacturing 19.8 18.4 38.1
Services 22.2 30.1 52.3





Agriculture and mining 2.5 3.5 6.1
Manufacturing 9.7 15.2 24.9
Services 26.9 42.1 69.0
Total 39.2 60.8 100.0
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
per cent to 39 per cent for services. These trends suggest that the UK detached
itself from the EU hub of many GVCs, at least if the destinations of its exports
are considered.
These trends might have made the UK less vulnerable to the Brexit-induced
trade barriers between the UK and the EU, though it should of course be noted
that the importance of the EU as a destination for UK exports remains very
significant in both gross and value added terms.
IV. Global value chains and the UK’s trade policy
In this section, we consider the implications of the patterns we described in
Section III for the UK’s future trade policy.
1. Potential impact of UK import tariffs on the UK’s export competitiveness
There are two ways that a country can seek to boost the competitiveness
of its exporters through changes in its trade policy. The first is to secure
reductions on import barriers other countries impose on its exports. The second,
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whose potential importance for the UK was highlighted in Section III, is
to reduce the trade barriers it applies to imported inputs used by domestic
firms. In this subsection, we consider how the UK’s post-Brexit trade policy
might affect the competitiveness of UK exporters via the second of these
channels.
Brexit could in principle affect the trade barriers to imported inputs in
two ways. First, new trade barriers may be imposed on the UK’s imports of
inputs from the EU. These could raise UK firms’ costs and potentially harm
competitiveness. Second, the UK could, through bilateral deals or unilateral
tariff reductions, reduce the cost of foreign inputs purchased from non-EU
countries. In what follows, we consider how these sorts of changes could
affect UK exporters by drawing on what the WIOD tables reveal about UK
firms’ current usage of foreign inputs.
Section III showed that foreign value added was (on average) relatively
unimportant for UK exporters. By itself, this would imply that changes in
the trade barriers applied to imported inputs would be unlikely to have
large effects on the competitiveness of UK exporters. However, in order to
understand the impacts of different Brexit scenarios on UK firms’ input costs,
it is important to consider not only the importance of foreign inputs, but also
their composition, sources and the potential trade barriers that may apply to
them. Take, for example, the impact of a ‘WTO rules’ Brexit in which the
UK and EU failed to strike a free trade deal. Under these circumstances,
tariff and non-tariff barriers would be imposed on the UK’s imports from the
EU. If UK firms made relatively more use of EU goods that would attract
particularly high tariffs, then their costs could significantly increase even if
their use of such inputs were small. Similarly, if the UK were to assert control
of its own tariff schedules, then the gains from tariff reductions on imported
inputs sourced from non-EU countries would depend on whether or not the
inputs UK firms made use of are currently subject to especially high rates of
protection.
a) Tariff changes
To understand how imposing import tariffs on EU suppliers or post-Brexit
reductions of tariffs on third countries might affect UK firms’ input costs,
we first consider which tariffs currently apply to those industries from which
the UK draws its intermediate inputs. To do this, we use the WIOD tables
to separate out which sorts of imports are used as intermediate inputs by
UK industries and which are used for final consumption by either firms or
households. We then calculate the average tariff that would be paid on each
category if the UK levied the EU’s current MFN tariffs on goods imported
from the EU (column 1 of Table 3) and if the EU’s MFN tariffs were levied on
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TABLE 3
Average MFN tariffs that would be charged on EU and non-EU imports of goods
and services for intermediate and final consumption















Intermediate 4.2% 2.6% 2.5% 1.7%
Final 9.5% 7.4% 5.9% 4.5%
Note: All tariffs are weighted by imports (by EU imports in columns 1 and 2 and by non-EU imports
in columns 3 and 4). Trade-weighted tariffs by industry are calculated using COMTRADE data for 2014
(which cover all imports whether for use as intermediate inputs or for final demand) aggregated up to
the 56 industry classifications in the WIOD tables. Imports of goods to the UK from the EU and non-EU
countries for each industry by purpose are then taken from theWIOD tables and used to separately calculate
weighted average tariffs for intermediate and final goods imports respectively. Tariffs are taken from 2016
but weighted with 2014 trade flows (the latest available year in the WIOD data). Specific duties have been
converted to ad-valorem equivalents.
Source: Authors’ calculations using WIOD (2016 release), TRAINS tariff data and COMTRADE trade
database.
all imports from the EU (column 2). We do the same for imports from non-EU
countries (columns 3 and 4).18
Tariff rates tend to be much larger for final consumption than they are for
intermediate goods. While the average MFN tariff that would apply to final
consumption goods imported from the EU is 9.5 per cent, the average tariff
that would be charged on intermediate goods is 4.2 per cent. When we include
all inputs (including imports of services, which attract no tariff), these figures
fall to 2.6 per cent and 7.4 per cent respectively. This reflects the fact that
intermediate goods imported by the UK tend to take the form of manufactured
goods or rawmaterials for which the EU’s current external tariffs are relatively
low. The kind of intermediate goods purchased from the rest of theworld attract
an MFN tariff of 2.5 per cent (falling to 1.7 per cent when foreign services are
included). This compares with an average MFN tariff on final goods imported
from outside the EU of 5.9 per cent.
18In practice, the EU’s various trade agreements mean that the actual tariff levied on imports from the
rest of the world will be lower than this. However, exporters in countries that have preferential tariff access
to the EU may raise their prices above those charged by alternative producers in countries that face the full
MFN tariff rate. This would mean that using average tariffs levied on UK imports might understate the full
effect of the tariff schedule on import costs.
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Now we turn to the question of the extent to which the current schedule of
external tariffs might affect the export competitiveness of UK industries. We
can calculate a measure of the impact of tariffs on firms’ input costs:





βUKaUKi j + βEUaEUi j + β ROWaROWi j
)
,(1)
where aUKi j is the input coefficient in the technical input–output matrix giving




i j is the inputs




i j is the inputs from non-EU foreign
countries. ti is the current EU (‘most-favoured nation’) ad-valorem tariff on
imports in industry i .19
The parameters βUK , βEU and β ROW determine the pass-through of tariff
costs to the prices of UK, EU and non-EU firms respectively. In principle, these
could also differ by industry. An assumption that βUK = βEU = β ROW = 1
would imply that there is full pass-through of tariffs to both foreign and
domestic prices (i.e. that, as a result of tariffs, the prices paid by UK firms for
inputs are higher by the EU’s current MFN tariff for each industry, regardless
of where those inputs are currently sourced from). This would occur under the
assumptions that the UK is a small open economy, there is perfect competition,
and all imported and domestic varieties of products within an industry are
perfect substitutes. Consistent with these assumptions, higher UK input costs
are assumed not to affect the prices of foreign intermediate inputs which may
themselves draw on UK inputs.
These assumptions are strong and counterfactual. They imply, for instance,
that UK firms gain no cost advantage either through the UK’s ability to trade
tariff-free with the EU or from the EU’s various trade agreements with third
countries which reduce or eliminate bilateral tariffs. However, they allow us to
calculate an upper bound for the possible impact of tariffs on firms’ input costs.
If we thought pass-through were incomplete, we could select lower values for
the β parameters.
In what follows, we therefore consider two cases when assessing the impact
of tariffs on production costs: one where βUK = βEU = β ROW = 1 and another
where βUK = 0 but βEU = β ROW = 1.
Table 4 shows the proportion of firms’ total input costs that are accounted for
by production from domestic industries, industries in the EU-27 and industries
located in the rest of the world (columns 1–3). EU inputs are most important
in the manufacturing industry, which also makes most use of inputs from the
rest of the world. Overseas inputs of all kinds are less important in service
industries (with the exception of the health sector).
19Feenstra (2017) sets out a related set of measures for ‘effective protection’ (the impact of tariffs on
firms’ value added taking into account output and input tariffs).
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Column 4 of the table shows how much input costs would fall if all
tariffs were abolished under the assumption of full pass-through of tariffs into
domestic and foreign prices. As we described above, this is likely to overstate
tariffs’ impact on firm costs. By this measure, the largest fall in costs would
be experienced by the hotels and restaurants sector, though this accounts for a
small fraction of the UK’s total exports (see column 7). Most significantly in
terms of UK exports, the manufacturing industry would experience a reduction
in costs of 1.55 per cent per unit of output. Overall, however, the gains in terms
of cost reductions for exporting firms are small (with an export-weighted
average of 0.87 per cent). In column 5, we assume zero pass-through to UK
prices (i.e. set βUK = 0). This substantially reduces the potential gain from
tariff reductions, with a particularly large effect on the gains for hotels and
restaurants (which source many of their inputs from the UK). The export-
weighted reduction in costs falls to 0.29 per cent. Manufacturers still enjoy
a reduction in costs which could be thought of as being equivalent to the
elimination of a 0.59 per cent output tariff in foreign markets.
What can we say about the possible actual values of the pass-through
parameters? They will depend crucially on two factors. The first is how well
production inputs from the rest of theworld could substitute for inputs currently
purchased from suppliers in the UK and EU. This is an area where there is a
great deal of uncertainty. Some studies point to considerable stickiness in firms’
supply chains. For instance, studies exploiting the effects of natural disasters
on firms’ suppliers find that these events can have important impacts on output
and sales, suggesting either that supplier relationships are highly specific and
thus difficult to replicate or that there are large (short-term) search or other
costs of identifying and establishing relationships with new suppliers.20 These
particular studies might be more relevant to a case where the UK imposes
trade barriers on EU inputs abruptly, leaving firms only limited time to prepare
(for instance, in the case where talks between the EU and the UK break down
and no deal is struck to manage a transition to trading under WTO rules). In
other circumstances, UK firms might have more time to adapt to new trade
barriers. Another approach to assess the impact of any new trade barriers is to
draw inferences based on empirically estimated trade elasticities. Accounting
for estimates of the relevant elasticities within a larger computable general
equilibrium model, Dhingra et al. (2016) find that unilateral tariff reduction
would only reduce the costs of a WTO rules Brexit in terms of GDP by 0.3
percentage points.
A second factor that will determine the effect of tariff reductions on input
costs is the degree to which firms pass on costs to end consumers rather than
increasing their markups. De Loecker et al. (2016) study the pass-through of
tariff reductions to firm margins in the context of trade liberalisation in India
20Boehm, Flaaen and Pandalai-Nayar, 2015; Barrot and Sauvagnat, 2016.
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over the period 1989–2003, finding that average tariff reductions of 62 per cent
led to an average reduction in firms’ marginal costs of 31 per cent. However,
because firms also raised their markups (by 13 per cent on average), these cost
reductions only translated into an 18 per cent reduction in output prices. Pass-
through was thus incomplete, though firms may have used profits to finance
investments in innovation and the introduction of new product varieties.
b) Non-tariff barriers
Of course, non-tariff barriers, which we have not considered in the above
analysis, pose an additional and important source of risk on top of that
associated with tariffs. As well as giving the UK more freedom to adjust
tariff schedules, leaving the EU Customs Union will also almost inevitably
lead to increased rules-of-origin checks and other customs checks on goods
imported to the UK from the EU. Other non-tariff barriers caused by regulatory
divergence and the need for products to conform with EU standards may be
particularly important for trade in food, services and high-end manufacturing.
Changes to freedom of movement between the UK and the EU may also affect
the costs of service imports and further affect firms’ input costs. All of these
costs are likely to be more difficult to reduce in bilateral negotiations with third
countries than tariff barriers.
A number of papers have shown that the effect of non-tariff barriers on trade
can be substantial. Hornok and Koren (2015) find that reducing administrative
barriers to trade by half would be equivalent in its effects on trade flows to a 9
percentage point reduction in tariffs and that customs unions between countries
are effective at reducing these costs. Alessandria, Kaboski and Midrigan
(2010) find that firms economise on per-shipment cost by importing goods
in larger quantities but less frequently and that importing firms hold more
goods in inventories. They find that such frictions have large ad-valorem
tariff-equivalent costs (estimated at 20 per cent) largely due to inventory
carrying expenses. Moreover, in general, the effects of tariff reductions on
purchases of foreign inputs are thought to be complementary both with the
effects of liberalisation in other non-tariff barriers and with foreign direct
investment (since foreign firmsmake greater andmore efficient use of imported
inputs).21 If Brexit were to increase tariffs and non-tariff barriers at the same
time as discouraging foreign direct investment, its effects on trade could be
compounded.
In column 6 of Table 4, we consider how UK industries’ input costs might
be affected by the combination of tariff and non-tariff barriers in the event of a
WTO rules Brexit where the UK leaves the EU without a free trade agreement
with its remaining members. To assess this, we consider the increase in firms’
input costs that would occur if there were full pass-through of tariffs and costs
21Halpern, Koren and Szeidl, 2015.
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associated with non-tariff barriers to the prices of EU inputs used by UK firms
(but no impact on the costs of UK-made inputs or non-EU imports). This
requires an assessment of the possible values of non-tariff barriers for different
sectors. We take these from the EU Exit Analysis Cross Whitehall Briefing
Paper, which expressed predicted non-tariff barriers in a WTO rules scenario
as ad-valorem tariff equivalents in different sectors.22 We allocate the sectors
used in this analysis to the WIOD industries and include them alongside tariff
costs.
Column 6 of Table 4 shows that the export-weighted average increase in
input costs from a WTO rules Brexit including non-tariff barriers is nearly
as great as that we attributed to the EU’s external tariffs in column 4. The
worst-affected industry in this case is manufacturing, which experiences a cost
increase equivalent to an output tariff of 1.52 per cent. This reflects the current
importance of EU inputs for manufacturing as well as the potentially high costs
associated with non-tariff barriers.
2. The role of the EU as a GVC link between the UK and the rest of the world
One of the arguments for leaving the EU Customs Union as put forward by
proponents of a so-called ‘hard’ Brexit relates to increased opportunities for the
UK to strike its own trade deals with third countries. These deals could be more
attractive than the deals (if any) that these countries currently have with the
EU. It is often argued that many of these countries (China and India are often
mentioned as prime examples) enjoy more rapid growth of consumption and
investment demand than the EU. Hence, viewed from a long-run perspective,
the UK would benefit from sacrificing strong trade relationships with the EU
in order to develop those with other countries. This strategy has frequently
been labelled ‘Global Britain’.
Several studies23 have found evidence that it is highly unlikely that UK
exports to third countries will increase sufficiently to compensate for the losses
in exports to the EU caused by a discontinuation of the UK’s membership of
the Customs Union. This is mainly due to the fact that geographic distance
is still a major determinant of trade volumes. The EU is not only a large
trade partner, but also a very nearby one. The much larger distances to
faster-growing markets such as China and India will prevent exports to these
countries increasing substantially, even if tariff and/or non-tariff trade barriers
are reduced considerably.
In a world characterised by production organised in GVCs, the UK does
not only benefit (in terms of the creation of value added) from the rapid
22This is a presentation made to the House of Commons Exiting the European Union Committee which
was leaked to the media in January 2018.
23See, for example, Brakman, Garretsen and Kohl (2018).
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increases in standards of living in a country such as China by exporting to that
country. In addition, other parts of the UK value added induced by Chinese
final demand enter China embodied in products imported from other countries,
including those in the EU. The share of UK value added exports (VAX-C)
to third countries such as China crossing borders between the UK and the
EU is at risk from Brexit, since tariff and non-tariff barriers will decrease
the competitiveness of these supply chains vis-a`-vis supply chains that do
not involve direct exports from the UK to the EU. The risk of losing this
part of VAX-D should be subtracted from the opportunities to benefit from
intensification of trade with third countries.
We computed the share of UK VAX-C to a third country G crossing the
border between the UK and the EU in two steps. We first computed the UK
value added in the production activities in the UK that can be attributed to
final demand in G. Next, we repeated this procedure, starting from a modified
inputs coefficients matrix in which requirements of industries in EU countries
for inputs imported from the UK are set to zero.24 The difference between the
two indicators is the UK VAX-C to country G that is hampered at least once
by trade barriers due to Brexit, and therefore ‘exposed to Brexit’.25
The results are documented in Table 5. Aggregated over all destinations,
the share of UK value added reaching the final destination in third countries
via direct exports to the EU amounts to 13 per cent. This average share hides a
lot of heterogeneity, however. For destination countries close to the EU (such
as Switzerland and Turkey), the shares tend to be considerably higher, whereas
value added exports to North America (Canada and the US) are less dependent
on the EU hub of the global production network.
Are these shares small or large, considered from a policy perspective?
We think they are large. In the extreme case in which all UK exports to the
EU would come to a halt when Brexit becomes effective, about $7.6 billion
UK value added exports to the US would be lost (see Table 5). In order to
compensate for this loss, improved trade relationships with the US need to lead
to slightly more than 10 per cent additional UK value added exports via direct
exports and/or indirectly via exports to other third countries. For the second
most important destination of UK value added exports (China), this increase
needs to equal 17 per cent, and for Switzerland (the third most important
destination country) more than 20 per cent. In view of the fact that external EU
tariffs tend to be rather low already (see Table 3), we consider it unlikely that
reductions of these alone will allow for the required intensifications of trade
relationships with third countries. This impression is strengthened by the fact
that the UK relies on services exports, for which tariffs are not the main trade
24See Los and Timmer (2018) and the appendix for related explanations.
25Chen et al., 2018.
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TABLE 5
UK value added exports for consumption (VAX-C) to non-EU countries, 2014
Destination country UK VAX-C
(US$ million)
UK VAX-C via the EU
(US$ million)
Share
United States 81,071 7,616 9.4%
China 31,007 4,508 14.5%
Switzerland 13,913 2,355 16.9%
Russia 13,344 2,046 15.3%
Canada 12,926 979 7.6%
Japan 11,801 1,578 13.4%
Australia 8,762 810 9.2%
Norway 8,011 1,047 13.1%
South Korea 7,464 901 12.1%
India 6,632 791 11.9%
Brazil 6,165 961 15.6%
Turkey 4,919 1,049 21.3%
Mexico 3,884 628 16.2%
Taiwan 2,565 383 14.9%
Indonesia 2,094 333 15.9%
Rest of the world 193,345 26,659 13.8%
Total 407,904 52,646 12.9%
Source: Authors’ computations based on WIOD, 2016 release (www.wiod.org).
barrier.26 Many experts consider it unlikely that it will be possible for the UK
to strike deep trade deals with third countries that would really lower barriers
to services trade, given that the EU Single Market is by far the most liberalised
international market for services in the world.
V. Conclusions and policy implications
The rise of global value chains has a number of general lessons for those
designing a country’s trade policy. Here we set out a few of these.
 Gross exports and imports between countries can give a misleading
impression of a country’s access to particular export markets. For instance,
by participating in international value chains, the UK can benefit from
rapidly growing demand in East Asia even if the UK itself does not directly
export to these markets.
 The increasingly interconnected nature of global trade means that a
country’s imports and exports cannot be treated as independent quantities.
A successful exporting country will also need to be open to imports.
26See, for example, Dhingra, Freeman and Mavroeidi (2018).
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Exports embed imports, and so greater access to imports can boost the
competitiveness and export performance of domestic firms.
 Demand for the exports of UK industries depends not only on the export
access ofUK-based firms but also on the export access of firms they supply.
If the UK remains an important supplier to EU firms, the trade deals the
EU signs will continue to have relevance for the UK in the coming years,
whether or not the UK leaves the Customs Union. This includes, of course,
the access the EU has to the UK market.
The UK’s current position in GVCs also has specific lessons for the UK’s
post-Brexit trade policy. A key objective behind the UK government’s current
aim of leaving the EU Customs Union is to increase the UK’s exports to
fast-growing emerging economies, potentially through reductions in tariffs on
firms’ inputs and by signing its own bilateral deals with these economies.
However, absent a radical shift in the composition of the UK’s exports
after Brexit, the high content of domestic services in UK exports limits the
potential for tariff reductions to boost UK firms’ export competitiveness. This
strong specialisation of the UK in exporting services might be overstated
as a consequence of recently discovered discrepancies between services trade
statistics as recorded by the national statistical institutes of the UK and its main
trading partners.27 This may also have led us to overstate the importance of
domestic value added inUK exports. At the time ofwriting, the nature and scale
of the mismeasurement are unknown, because major bilateral discrepancies
have been found for services imports as well as services exports. It is thus
unclear at this stage whether improvements in the data would lead us to revise
our estimates of the domestic value added share in UK exports upwards or
downwards, and to what degree.
In addition to the fact that the benefits of leaving the Customs Union might
be limited, there is a risk that increased barriers between the UK and the EU
will threaten the UK’s participation in value chains that already supply rapidly
growing demands in emerging markets.
Survey evidence points to the possibility that Brexit may disrupt cross-
border supply chains between the UK and the EU. A survey by the Chartered
Institute of Procurement & Supply (2017) found that 32 per cent of UK supply
chain managers who worked with EU suppliers were preparing for Brexit by
looking for alternative suppliers within the UK (21 per cent were looking for
suppliers outside the EU). The same survey also found that 46 per cent of
European supply chain managers with links to the UK expected to reduce their
use of UK suppliers, with 28 per cent expecting to ‘re-shore’ all or part of their
supply chain to the EU. In light of this, tracing the impact of any change in
27See Office for National Statistics (2018).
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UK–EU trade barriers on the UK’s position in global value chains is likely to
be an important area for future research.
Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
• Appendix
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